Robustness Certification for Point Cloud Models by Lorenz, Tobias et al.
Robustness Certification for Point Cloud Models
Tobias Lorenz*1, Anian Ruoss2, Mislav Balunović2, Gagandeep Singh3, Martin Vechev2
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The use of deep 3D point cloud models in safety-critical
applications, such as autonomous driving, dictates the need
to certify the robustness of these models to real-world trans-
formations. This is technically challenging, as it requires a
scalable verifier tailored to point cloud models that handles
a wide range of semantic 3D transformations. In this work,
we address this challenge and introduce 3DCertify, the first
verifier able to certify the robustness of point cloud models.
3DCertify is based on two key insights: (i) a generic relax-
ation based on first-order Taylor approximations, applica-
ble to any differentiable transformation, and (ii) a precise
relaxation for global feature pooling, which is more com-
plex than pointwise activations (e.g., ReLU or sigmoid) but
commonly employed in point cloud models. We demonstrate
the effectiveness of 3DCertify by performing an extensive
evaluation on a wide range of 3D transformations (e.g., ro-
tation, twisting) for both classification and part segmenta-
tion tasks. For example, we can certify robustness against
rotations by ±60° for 95.7% of point clouds, and our max
pool relaxation increases certification by up to 15.6%.
1. Introduction
Deep learning has achieved remarkable success in tasks
involving 3D objects such as autonomous driving [8, 9, 26].
As such applications are typically safety-critical, recent
work has investigated methods for quantifying the robust-
ness of these systems via adversarial attacks, demonstrat-
ing the vulnerability of state-of-the-art point cloud mod-
els to semantic transformations and noise-based perturba-
tions [28, 53, 60, 62, 66]. Another line of work introduced
defenses [62, 65, 67], aiming to improve a models’ robust-
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ness against these attacks. However, as demonstrated in the
image recognition domain, such defenses are usually bro-
ken by more powerful attacks [1, 49], resulting in an arms
race between stronger defenses and even stronger attacks.
To break this cycle, one ideally needs a proof that a deep
learning model is robust against any adversarial attack, un-
der some threat model. This proof is usually obtained by
invoking a neural network verifier on a deep learning model
and a model input, where the verifier attempts to provide a
certificate that the model is robust to any transformation of
this input. While plenty of verifiers have been proposed in
the image recognition domain [5, 19, 42, 44, 48, 56, 64], no
such verifier exists for 3D point cloud models.
This work: certification of 3D point clouds In this work
we propose the first verifier for 3D point cloud models,
called 3DCertify. As point cloud models are too complex
for exact verification (e.g., MILP [48]), the key challenge
one must address is designing scalable and precise convex
relaxations capturing all point clouds that could result from
transforming the original (input) point cloud. In our work,
we address this challenge and introduce such relaxations
for a large family of common differentiable 3D transforma-
tions, including rotation, twisting, tapering, shearing, and
arbitrary compositions of these transformations.
Robustness certification is achieved by propagating our
3D relaxations through the network using existing verifiers
(e.g., DeepPoly [44] or LiRPA [61]). This modular design
allows our method to benefit from future advances in ver-
ification. For instance, we observe that existing verifiers
incur a significant loss of precision at the max pool layer,
often overlooked when designing verifiers for image classi-
fiers, yet a critical feature of 3D point cloud models [36].
We address this issue by designing a more precise max pool
relaxation which is more precise than existing solutions in
practice while being applicable beyond point cloud models.
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Using 3DCertify, we are able to certify, for the first time,
the robustness of the PointNet [36] model to semantic trans-
formations on two challenging tasks: object classification
on the ModelNet40 [59] dataset and part segmentation on
the ShapeNet [7] dataset. We consider PointNet since, de-
spite its relatively simple architecture, it performs well in
terms of classification, segmentation, and certification, and
provides the basis for more complex models [37, 52], which
could be certified with future advances in verification.
Key contributions Our main contributions are:
• A novel framework based on first-order Taylor approx-
imations for fast computation of linear relaxations of
semantic 3D transformations of point clouds.
• A scalable linear relaxation for max pool that is prov-
ably more precise than prior work while being widely
applicable to certification tasks beyond point clouds.
• The identification of inherent accuracy-robustness
trade-offs in point cloud networks and a detailed ab-
lation study of robustness-enhancing methods.
• The first robustness verifier of 3D point cloud models
for object classification and part segmentation.
• A comprehensive experimental evaluation of our
method on the PointNet [36] architecture and differ-
ent datasets using a variety of semantic transforma-
tions. We make our implementation publicly available
at https://github.com/eth-sri/3dcertify.
2. Background & Related Work
We now provide the necessary background on 3D
point clouds and neural network certification, and give an
overview of work closely related to ours in these areas.
3D point cloud models 3D data can be represented in
several different ways (e.g., 2D projections, 3D voxels, or
3D meshes), each with distinct advantages for specific ap-
plications. In this work, we consider 3D point clouds, which
represent an object as an unordered set of points. Point
clouds are sparse, requiring less space than, e.g., voxels,
and are the natural representation of 3D sensors such as LI-
DAR devices. The key challenge for neural networks han-
dling point clouds is to be invariant to permutations in the
order of 3D points. Qi et al. [36] were the first to address
this challenge with their novel PointNet architecture, which
aggregates local, pointwise features with a symmetric func-
tion (usually max pool) to obtain a permutation-invariant
global feature vector that can be processed by any task-
specific network, including classification and part segmen-
tation models. In an effort to boost model performance, the
PointNet architecture has been extended to include local in-
formation [37, 52], or rotation-invariant features [25].
Adversarial attacks on point cloud models Qi et al. [36]
performed an initial investigation of the robustness of the
PointNet architecture by introducing the concepts of crit-
ical points and upper bound shapes. They demonstrated
that all sampled point clouds lying between critical points
and upper bound shapes generate the same global feature
vectors and thus obtain the same classification. However,
this form of robustness quantification only holds for the
concrete samples and does not consider adversarial trans-
formations. The latter problem was addressed by a recent
line of work that extended the well-studied problem of ad-
versarial attacks for images to the 3D point cloud domain
by considering adversarial point perturbation and genera-
tion [20, 23, 28, 29, 53, 60, 62], real-world adversarial ob-
jects for LIDAR sensors [6], occlusion attacks [55], and ad-
versarial rotations [66]. The adversarial vulnerability of 3D
point cloud models has spurred the development of corre-
sponding defense methods, based on perturbation measure-
ment [62], outlier removal and upsampling [67], and adver-
sarial training [28, 65]. However, similar to the image set-
ting, many of these adversarial defenses were later broken
by stronger attacks [46], illustrating the need for provable
robustness guarantees of 3D point cloud models.
Neural network certification Existing certifiers prove
the robustness of image and NLP models: they compute a
certificate which guarantees that no attack in a given range
can change the predicted label (local robustness). These
approaches generally focus on ℓp-norm threat models (i.e.,
changing pixel intensities) and are based on the following
three-step process: (i) compute a convex shape that encloses
the space of all inputs obtainable from a given threat model,
implying that the shape is sound, (ii) propagate the input
shape through the network to obtain an output shape on the
logits, and (iii) check that all concrete outputs within that
output shape are classified to the correct class. For smaller
networks, certification can be performed exactly with SMT
solvers [19] or mixed-integer linear programming [48], but
scaling to bigger networks requires computing an over-
approximation of the output shape which can cause false
positives, i.e., the verifier fails to prove robustness even
though it holds. A variety of such methods have been pro-
posed based on semi-definite relaxations [38], linear relax-
ations [4, 5, 14, 27, 41, 43, 44, 51, 54, 56, 61, 64], or com-
binations of solvers and the above [34, 42, 45, 50]. These
overapproximation methods compute convex relaxations
for nonlinear network operations (e.g., ReLU or max pool).
The main challenge in the design of these relaxations is bal-
ancing their cost and precision. Certification can also be
performed via randomized smoothing [10, 22, 40], which,
however, provides probabilistic guarantees for a smoothed
version of the original model and also incurs overhead dur-
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Figure 1. Overview of 3DCertify, consisting of two components: (i) a method to compute linear relaxations of 3D transformations for
point clouds, and (ii) an improved network verifier. The first stage receives a point cloud and a transformation as input and computes a
linear relaxation around all possible transformed point clouds. This relaxation is passed to the second stage, where the verifier tries to prove
that a given network correctly classifies the input object under all (infinitely many) transformations. The verifier leverages our improved
relaxation for the global max pool commonly employed in 3D models, enabling certification of significantly more objects than prior work.
Certification of semantic transformations Beside ℓp-
norm threat models, neural network certification against se-
mantic image transformations (e.g., rotation or translation)
have been recently considered. These approaches use enu-
meration [35], intervals [44], linear relaxations [2, 33, 39],
or randomized smoothing [11, 24]. Inspired by random-
ized smoothing, concurrent work [30] computes probabilis-
tic certificates for point cloud models against modifying a
few individual points (addition or deletion), but cannot han-
dle the semantic transformations considered in our work
(e.g., rotations or shearing). Another concurrent work [12]
introduces an alternative approach to certify segmentation
based on randomized smoothing. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no prior certification method can handle the type
of transformations on point cloud models which we con-
sider. To achieve our goal, we leverage the high-level
idea of DeepG [2], i.e., we compute linear bounds on the
transformed point positions in terms of the transformation
parameters (e.g., rotation angle). DeepG computes these
bounds via a combination of sampling and optimization,
which is asymptotically optimal but can unfortunately re-
quire exponential time for 3D transformations with many
variables. Accordingly, this severely affects the practical-
ity of the method, as we demonstrate experimentally. Thus,
in our work, we first show how to generalize DeepG to the
3D point cloud setting and then introduce a more efficient
(constant time) relaxation framework specifically tailored
to point clouds. The asymptotic benefit is also reflected in
practice, where we demonstrate 1000x speed-ups over the
DeepG generalization, with minimal or no loss of precision.
We achieve end-to-end certification by providing our lin-
ear bounds as input to neural network verifiers, such as
DeepPoly [44] and LiRPA [61], which work by overapprox-
imating common functions (e.g., ReLU) with a linear upper
and lower bound for every output in terms of its inputs. To
further improve on our results, we develop a novel max pool
relaxation compatible with these verifiers (LiRPA does not
support max pool, and DeepPoly’s relaxation is imprecise
as we will show experimentally). Finally, we show that our
relaxations are generally applicable and of interest beyond
the point cloud setting.
3. 3DCertify: 3D Point Cloud Verifier
We now present 3DCertify, our novel system for cer-
tifying the robustness of deep learning models for point
clouds against perturbations on the input data. A high-level
overview of 3DCertify is shown in Fig. 1. Given a neural
network (e.g., PointNet), a point cloud (e.g., airplane), and
a transformation (e.g., ±60° rotation), the goal of our sys-
tem is to prove that all transformed point clouds are clas-
sified correctly by the network. The original point cloud
and all considered transformations are shown in the left part
of Fig. 1. Verification using our system consists of two
main parts: (i) a general method for computing linear re-
laxations on a semantic transformation function, and (ii) an
improved network verifier to certify the robustness of point
cloud models based on these linear relaxations. Our system
is highly modular: various convex relaxations can be used
in the first part, and a wide range of network verifiers (both
complete and incomplete) can be used in the second part.
For the first part of 3DCertify, we propose two differ-
ent methods for computing linear relaxations of the trans-
formation function, each with different benefits and draw-
backs: (a) a generalization of DeepG [2] from images to
3D point clouds, and (b) a novel framework based on first-
3
order Taylor approximations. The DeepG generalization
(Section 3.1) computes asymptotically optimal constraints
but is more expensive, especially for transformations with
many parameters. In contrast, our Taylor relaxations (Sec-
tion 3.2) are fast to compute (in constant time), with mini-
mal precision loss over the constraints from DeepG.
For the second part, we leverage the state-of-the-art ver-
ifiers DeepPoly [44] and LiRPA [61], which scale well to
large networks in terms of computational complexity and
certification performance. The key challenge in applying
such verifiers to point cloud models is to precisely over-
approximate the large, global max pool layer. Current 2D
verifiers were designed for small pooling sizes and thus are
imprecise for large pooling layers with thousands of inputs.
We address this challenge by designing a more precise max
pool relaxation, which we present in Section 3.3.
Notation We define a point cloud P of size n as P =
{p(j) | p(j) ∈ R3, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}}, where each
p(j) = (x, y, z)T is a point in 3D space. We denote all
vectors v in bold and their i-th entry as vi. A point cloud
transformation is a function which changes the position of
the point cloud’s points based on global transformation pa-
rameters. Formally, we define a transformation function as
f : R3×n × Rk → R3×n, where k is the number of pa-
rameters. f is applied to the point cloud prior to passing it
to the neural network. Thus, with slight abuse of notation,
given the network N(P ) and the transformation function
f(P,θ) with parameters θ ∈ Rk, we try to certify the ro-
bustness of N under transformation f for P by showing
that the network output N(f(P,θ)) is invariant for a range
of transformation parameters lθ ≤ θ ≤ uθ. To achieve
this, we will compute precise linear relaxations of the trans-
formation function f(P,θ), consisting of upper and lower
constraints fu and fl. These constraints are linear in the
transformation parameters θ, i.e., fl(P,θ) = θTwl+bl and
fu(P,θ) = θ
Twu + bu, and must ensure that for the pa-
rameters lθ ≤ θ ≤ uθ the inequality fl(P,θ) ≤ f(P,θ) ≤
fu(P,θ) holds (both point- and coordinatewise).
3.1. Generalizing DeepG
DeepG [2] computes sound and asymptotically optimal
linear relaxations for any composition of semantic trans-
formations, but is limited to the 2D image domain. Here,
we show how to generalize DeepG to the 3D point cloud
setting. We only show the necessary changes, treating the
remaining parts of DeepG as a black box, and we refer in-
terested readers to the original work for further details. To
compute the linear relaxations, DeepG relies on a combina-
tion of sampling and optimization, and guarantees asymp-
totic optimality with increasing samples and tolerance pa-
rameter ϵ. The optimization procedure performs reverse-
mode automatic differentiation and thus requires the Jaco-
bian of each transformation, both with respect to inputs and
parameters. Since each point p ∈ P is transformed inde-
pendently of the other points, we can state the transforma-
tion in terms of p and apply it to each point individually. We
provide the corresponding Jacobians for the 3D transforma-
tions rotation, shearing, tapering, and twisting in App. A.
3.2. Taylor Approximations
In the previous section, we showed that we can compute
precise linear relaxations for point clouds by generalizing
DeepG. However, DeepG needs to solve an optimization
problem for each individual point coordinate. While this
works well for quasilinear functions with a small parame-
ter space, processing highly nonlinear functions with many
parameters is exponentially more expensive. We therefore
propose a novel, alternative framework to compute linear
constraints in constant time based on first-order Taylor ap-
proximations. Our method can be applied to any twice con-
tinuously differentiable transformation function and also
extends to compositions of multiple such transformations.
Linear approximation For any function f(P,θ) that is
differentiable on the interval lθ ≤ θ ≤ uθ, the first-order
Taylor polynomial [47] provides a linear approximation of
f around the point t = (uθ + lθ)/2 with approximation
error R(P,θ):







Our key insight is that we can use Eq. (1) to compute sound
linear upper and lower bounds for f(P,θ), provided that
we can bound the approximation error R(P,θ) with two
constant terms LR ≤ R(P,θ) ≤ UR, for LR, UR ∈ R3×n.
Error bounds For twice continuously differentiable












for some ξ between t and θ. Using the closed intervals
θ = [lθ,uθ] and ξ = [lθ,uθ] as inputs, we can compute
the upper and lower bounds UR and LR for R(P,θ) using
standard interval arithmetic. This means that we evaluate
the functions on closed intervals instead of concrete values,
resulting in an output interval containing the entire range
of possible output values given the input intervals. Conse-
quently, the effect of the individual functions on the input
interval is generally overapproximated, so that the resulting
interval bounds are not necessarily exact but always sound.
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Therefore, the resulting upper linear constraint






(P, t) + UR (3)
and lower linear constraint






(P, t) + LR (4)
create a sound overapproximation of f on [lθ,uθ].
Rotation example We demonstrate this computation with
rotation around the z-axis RotZ , and we provide the relax-
ations for rotation around multiple axes, as well as shearing,
tapering and twisting in App. A. The transformation func-
tion for rotation around the z-axis is
RotZ(p, θ) =
x cos(θ)− y sin(θ)x sin(θ) + y cos(θ)
z
 . (5)
Recall that each point p ∈ P is transformed independently,
and we can thus apply our method to each point individu-
ally. We consider the rotation interval θ = [−π/2, π/2],












−x cos(ξ) + y sin(ξ)−x sin(ξ)− y cos(ξ)
0
 θ2 (7)
for ξ ∈ [−π/2, π/2]. To bound this term with constant
bounds LR ≤ R(p, θ) ≤ UR, we evaluate the entire func-
tion by replacing ξ = [−π/2, π/2] and θ = [−π/2, π/2]




−x[0, 1] + y[−1, 1]−x[−1, 1]− y[0, 1]
0
 [0, π2/4]. (8)





Composition of transformations Given twice continu-
ously differentiable transformations f(P,ϕ) and g(P,ψ),
the composition h(P,θ) = g(f(P,ϕ),ψ) is also twice con-
tinuously differentiable in θ = (ϕ,ψ)T (proof in App. B).
Thus, we can directly compute its linear relaxation with the
chain rule, using the first- and second-order partial deriva-
tives of f and g. Our framework therefore naturally extends
to the composition of multiple transformation functions.
3.3. Improved Max Pool Relaxation
Many deep learning models for point clouds, including
PointNet, use a global or semi-global max pool layer to ag-
gregate local, pointwise features into permutation-invariant
global features. Consequently, these pooling layers operate
on thousands of input variables, orders of magnitude more
than image classification models. Since state-of-the-art re-
laxations for max pool are designed for the 2D case with
few inputs, applying these methods out-of-the-box to point
cloud models causes substantial precision loss (App. E).
Addressing the above problem by designing more pre-
cise linear constraints for max pool is inherently difficult, as
it requires reasoning in much higher dimensions compared
to most univariate activation functions (e.g., ReLU). The
state-of-the-art linear relaxations from DeepPoly for the
max function y = maxi xi over input neurons xi with cor-
responding upper and lower bounds ui and li are: y ≥ xj
for j = argmaxi li as a lower bound and y ≤ umax =
maxi ui as the upper bound. For the lower bound, any
xi would give a sound bound, since we know y ≥ xi.
However, we have no such guarantees for the upper bound.
DeepPoly simply uses the constant umax, which does not
preserve relationship between neurons, causing significant
precision loss. We therefore propose a scalable and more
precise upper bound which preserves this relation.
As a first step, we check if we can prove that there exists
an input neuron xj which is always greater than the rest, that
is: xj > xi ̸=j . If this is the case, we simply return y ≤ xj as
the upper bound. For example, consider the simplified case
y := max{x1, x2} with x1 ∈ [−1,−0.1] and x2 ∈ [0, 1].
Then x1 < x2 for all inputs and our result y = x2 is exact.
Otherwise, we compute an upper bound based on the
convex hull of all possible cases y = xj , xj ≥ xi for all
possible j. In the two-variate example with x1 ∈ [−1, 0.25]
and x2 ∈ [0, 1], we cannot prove x2 < x1 or x1 < x2
for all inputs and instead must consider both cases S1 =
{y = x1, x1 ≥ x2, x1 ∈ [−1, 0.25], x2 ∈ [0, 1]} and
S2 = {y = x2, x2 ≥ x1, x1 ∈ [−1, 0.25], x2 ∈ [0, 1]}.
Certifying all cases separately is prohibitive in practice, as it
scales poorly with increasing input dimension and network
depth. Instead, we compute the convex hull of S1 and S2
via the double description method [13], the state-of-the-art
for high-dimensional convex hull computation. The double
description method represents a polytope both with the set
of constraints and vertices and uses a conversion algorithms
to convert between the two representations.
For vertex representations V1 and V2 of S1 and S2,
the convex hull vertices are V1 ∪ V2, and the conver-
sion computes output constraints S = {y ∈ [0, 1], x1 ∈
[−1, 0.25], x2 ∈ [0, 1], y ≥ x1, y ≥ x2, y ≤ 0.2 + 0.2x1 +
x2, y ≤ 0.25 + 0.75x2}. Certification with S is faster than
considering the two cases S1 and S2 separately, but it can
still be expensive due to multiple linear constraints. There-
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fore, we relax S further by computing its DeepPoly [44]
relaxation, keeping the interval bounds and one upper and
lower polyhedral constraint for y. Prior work does not
compute the convex hull and obtains y ∈ [0, 1] as inter-
val bounds and x2 ≤ y ≤ 1 as polyhedral bounds. Note
that the upper polyhedral bound is the same as the upper
interval bound. In contrast, we obtain polyhedral bounds
y ≤ 0.2 + 0.2x1 + x2 and y ≤ 0.25 + 0.75x2 from
S. To choose one among them, we compute the upper
bound of the right-hand-side by replacing x1 and x2 with
their interval bounds, obtaining 1.25 and 1, respectively.
We choose 0.25 + 0.75x2 with the smaller right-hand-side
as our polyhedral bound, and our result is y ∈ [0, 1] and
x2 ≤ y ≤ 0.25 + 0.75x2. While in this example our relax-
ation is strictly more precise than prior work, one cannot al-
ways theoretically establish increased precision. However,
extensive experiments (Section 4.2) show that our method
is significantly more precise in practice.
While this linear upper bound is more precise than state-
of-the-art, it cannot be directly employed to certify point
cloud models, since the complexity of convex hull compu-
tation grows exponentially in the number of input neurons,
rendering the above computation infeasible for the thou-
sands of neurons pooled in PointNet. Our key insight is to
decompose the max pool operation into small groups of up
to 10 neurons and to apply the max function recursively,
making the computation tractable. For example, to take
the max over 16 neurons {x1, . . . , x16}, we first compute
y1 = max{x1, . . . , x8} and y2 = max{x9, . . . , x16} and
then merge both groups to obtain y = max{y1, y2}. This
allows us to scale our refined relaxation to large point cloud
models, achieving significant improvements over the cur-
rent state-of-the-art. We investigate the trade-off between
running time and certification precision for different group
sizes in App. D.1.
4. Experimental Evaluation
To illustrate the broad applicability of 3DCertify, we per-
form extensive experiments on different transformations,
models, and tasks. Section 4.1 evaluates 3DCertify on
a wide range of semantic transformations, comparing our
generalization of DeepG, denoted as DeepG3D, and our
Taylor framework, denoted as Taylor3D, to different base-
lines and analyzing the trade-off between our two methods.
We investigate the impact of our improved max pool relax-
ation in Section 4.2, and we conduct an ablation study of the
impact of various robustness-enhancing methods, such as
adversarial training, in Section 4.3. Finally, we demonstrate
the broad applicability of 3DCertify by performing the first
robustness certification for part segmentation in Section 4.4.
We make all of our code and models publicly available at
https://github.com/eth-sri/3dcertify.
Experimental setup We use PointNet [36] models for all
experiments since, despite their relatively simple architec-
ture, they perform well for classification, part segmenta-
tion, and certification. Furthermore, PointNet is the basis
for more complex, state-of-the-art models [37, 52], which
could be certified with future verification advancements.
For classification, we evaluate 3DCertify on the 3D ob-
jects from the ModelNet40 [59] dataset, which are repre-
sented as point clouds and assigned to one of 40 different
categories, such as tables or airplanes. We use the Point-
Net classification architecture introduced by Qi et al. [36]
without T-Nets and perform experiments for different point
cloud sizes, for which we train separate versions of the
model. We apply the standard pre-processing pipeline [36]
to the point clouds: centering, scaling to the unit sphere,
and rotating randomly around the z(up)-axis. These normal-
izations render the model invariant to translation and scal-
ing, which is why we do not consider these transformations,
even though our system could easily handle them.
For certification of classification models, we report the
percentage of correctly classified objects for which we can
guarantee correct classification under all input transforma-
tions. All reported numbers are averages over a random
subset of 100 objects from the test set (consistent with prior
work [2, 33, 39]). We use the same random subset for all
experiments, and, unless otherwise noted, we run all exper-
iments on point clouds with 64 points using our improved
max pool relaxation and the DeepPoly verifier [44].
Splitting To increase certification precision for transfor-
mations with few parameters (e.g., rotation with one angle),
one can split the parameter space into multiple smaller sub-
sets (e.g., split rotation by [−θ, θ] into [−θ, 0] and [0, θ])
and certify correct classification on each subset individually.
Then, if we can certify correct classification for all subsets,
we can infer correct classification for their union. While
this technique has been successfully applied to extend cer-
tification to larger parameter ranges [2, 33, 44], it can only
be employed for transformations with few parameters since
the cost grows exponentially in the number of parameters.
Both DeepG3D and Taylor3D naturally support splitting.
4.1. Semantic Transformations
Using 3DCertify, we evaluate the robustness of PointNet
to several semantic transformations: rotation around one,
two, and all three axes, shearing, twisting, and tapering, as
well as compositions of these transformations. We compare
the precision of our relaxations with two baselines: sim-
ple interval bounds, as well as refined bounds using implicit
splitting introduced by Mohapatra et al. [33] with 15 625
splits, which we extend to the 3D domain. Finally, we an-
alyze the trade-off between certification performance and
computational complexity for DeepG3D and Taylor3D.
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RotZ RotZX RotZYX
±θ 20° 60° 5° 10° 2° 5°
Interval 70.7 54.3 6.5 3.3 1.1 0.0
Mohapatra et al. [33] 84.8 80.4 10.9 4.3 1.1 1.1
Ours (DeepG3D) 96.7 95.7 89.1 73.9 72.8 58.7
Ours (Taylor3D) 96.7 95.7 89.1 73.9 69.6 58.7
Table 1. Certification for rotation around one, two, and three axes.
Rotation Rotation is one of the most common transfor-
mations of 3D objects. In particular, an object’s rotation
around the up-axis is often arbitrary and thus any model
should be robust to changes in upright orientation. Ad-
ditionally, a model should not be fooled by small rota-
tions around the other axes. We perform thorough exper-
iments for robustness certification of different rotation an-
gles around one, two, and all three axes, displaying the re-
sults in Table 1. All rotations are performed for ±θ, i.e.,
the total rotation angle is 2θ, with splits of 2° along each
dimension. For rotations around a single axis, both our re-
laxations enable certification of almost all objects for up to
±60°, which is equivalent to one third of all possible object
orientations and significantly improves over both baselines.
For two and three rotation axes, we certify robustness up to
±5° and ±3° respectively (again outperforming both base-
lines), since the number of splits required scales exponen-
tially, as discussed above. Finally, to demonstrate that our
system is independent of the concrete verifier, we also in-
stantiate the LiRPA verifier [61] with Taylor3D to certify ro-
bustness against RotZ for ±1° without splitting. DeepPoly
certifies 97.8% and LiRPA certifies 95.7% of the objects,
showing that 3DCertify can effectively certify robustness of
PointNet independent of the concrete verifier used.
Additional transformations In addition to rotation,
3DCertify also handles shearing, twisting, and tapering, as
well as compositions thereof. We compare certification ac-
curacy and running time for DeepG3D and Taylor3D in Ta-
ble 2 and observe that the relaxations are almost identical
in terms of certification precision, although DeepG3D is
slightly more precise in some cases such as Twist ◦ RotZ .
However, Taylor3D is orders of magnitude faster, particu-
larly for transformations with multiple parameters. For ex-
ample, Taylor3D requires 65ms to achieve the same certifi-
cation for Twist◦Taper◦RotZ as DeepG3D, which needs
65447ms (a 1000x speed-up). Unlike DeepG3D, Taylor3D
could thus be employed in settings requiring instant certi-
fication feedback (e.g., real-time applications). We further
demonstrate the effortless scaling of Taylor3D to real-world
point clouds with up to 300k points [15] in App. D.2.
4.2. Improved Max Pool Relaxation
Scaling certification to large point clouds poses signifi-
cant challenges for verifiers due to the much larger number
of neurons involved in global feature pooling, underlining
Certified (%) Time (ms)
f(P, θ) ±θ Taylor3D DeepG3D Taylor3D DeepG3D
RotZYX
1° 73.9 73.9 8.87 391
1.5° 8.7 8.7 6.88 405
Shear
0.02 93.5 93.5 0.07 230
0.03 70.7 70.7 0.07 228
Taper
0.1 81.5 81.5 0.46 232
0.2 28.3 28.3 0.47 232
Twist
10 76.1 76.1 0.70 209
20 23.9 23.9 0.64 211
Twist ◦
RotZ
10, 1° 57.6 60.9 3.04 580
20, 1° 7.6 16.3 3.21 515
Taper ◦
RotZ
0.1, 1° 69.6 68.5 4.64 531
0.2, 1° 20.7 20.7 4.54 918
Twist ◦
Taper ◦ RotZ
10, 0.1, 1° 20.7 20.7 64.08 32216
20, 0.2, 1° 5.4 5.4 65.04 65447
Table 2. Certification of different transformations and composi-
tions thereof. DeepG3D provides slightly more precise certifica-
tion, while Taylor3D is orders of magnitude more efficient.
Points 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024
Boopathy et al. [5] 3.7 3.6 3.3 2.2 4.4 5.6 6.7
DeepPoly [44] 95.1 94.0 91.3 72.2 51.1 39.3 28.1
Ours (Taylor3D) 97.5 94.0 93.5 81.1 66.7 49.4 37.1
Table 3. Certification of RotZ with θ = ±3° for different max
pool relaxations. Our relaxation is significantly more precise, par-
ticularly for large point clouds (i.e., large pooling layers).
the importance of a precise max pool relaxation such as the
one we introduced in Section 3.3. We compare our new max
pool relaxation to the DeepPoly relaxation [44], as it is the
basis upon which we improve. We also integrate the linear
relaxation proposed by Boopathy et al. [5] into DeepPoly as
an additional baseline. We compare certification for rotation
around one axis for ±3° without splitting on point clouds of
different sizes in Table 3. Our improved relaxation provides
the best results in all settings, improving by up to 15.6%
over the current state-of-the-art and with particular benefits
for large point cloud sizes, which are essential in the con-
text of 3D point cloud models. We further demonstrate the
broad applicability of our max pool relaxation with experi-
ments on computer vision models in App. D.1.
4.3. Boosting Certified Robustness
It is well established that certified robustness of image
classification models can be significantly increased via ad-
versarial and provable training [3, 17, 32, 58, 63]. Here,
we generalize such robust training methods to the 3D point
cloud domain. Moreover, we identify that common point
cloud network components lead to substantial trade-offs in
terms of accuracy and certified robustness, providing essen-
tial insights to guide future architecture design.
In the 2D domain, adversarial threat models are gener-
ally formulated in terms of ℓp-norms quantifying the pixel
intensity perturbation. Such ℓp-norm threat models extend
naturally to the 3D point cloud setting, where they capture
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Accuracy (%) Certified (%)
Global Pooling Training 64 256 64 256
Max Pool
Natural 85.7 86.1 0.0 0.0
Adversarial 84.4 85.6 22.2 3.2
Provable 77.6 79.1 91.4 84.7
Average Pool
Natural 81.9 84.0 0.0 0.0
Adversarial 80.1 80.7 47.7 43.7
Provable 72.7 72.6 85.3 76.7
Table 4. Ablation study for robustness-enhancing methods with
pointwise ℓ∞-perturbations on 64 and 256 points with ϵ = 0.01.
the spatial perturbation of every point. We consider the ℓ∞-
norm, which restricts perturbations to an ϵ-box around the
original point coordinates and corresponds to the commonly
studied Hausdorff distance in the 3D adversarial attack lit-
erature [29, 53, 60, 62]. Note that perturbations shift each
point independently from all others, unlike e.g., rotation.
We conduct an ablation study for various robustness-
enhancing methods, including adversarial (FGSM) [16, 57]
and provable (IBP) [17] training, and using different sym-
metric feature-aggregation functions (average pool and max
pool). We use the fast adversarial training variant of FGSM
by Wong et al. [57] since it is orders of magnitude faster
than PGD [31] (and thus applicable to point cloud models)
but provides similar performance in terms of certified ro-
bustness. We compare the accuracy and certified robustness
in Table 4 and observe that average pool leads to a notable
drop in accuracy (roughly 5%), confirming the results by
Qi et al. [36]. While naturally trained models are not prov-
ably robust against perturbations, adversarial training sig-
nificantly improves the robustness, particularly for average
pool, which DeepPoly can encode exactly regardless of the
point cloud size. In contrast, certification with max pool is
challenging (particularly for larger point clouds) due to its
nonlinearity – even with our improved relaxation. Provable
training further increases robustness, although less for aver-
age pool than for max pool since IBP training uses intervals
that are less precise for average pool than for max pool.
Running the same experiment with max pool and IBP
training for point clouds with 2048 points results in a model
with 77.4% accuracy and 94.9% certification, confirming
the scalability of our approach to large point cloud sizes.
4.4. Part Segmentation
In addition to object classification, we consider the
safety-relevant task of part segmentation. For part segmen-
tation, a model tries to predict which part of an object a
point belongs to, e.g., the wings of an airplane or the legs
of a chair. We show that 3DCertify, powered by our relax-
ations, is the first certification system to successfully handle
this task, proving its usefulness beyond object classification.
For part segmentation, we use the ShapeNet-Part [7]
dataset, which contains different classes of 3D objects with
part annotations for each point. We train a part segmen-
±θ Interval Mohapatra et al. [33] DeepG3D Taylor3D
5° 44.1 50.5 96.6 96.5
10° 32.2 46.5 95.7 95.6
Table 5. Ratio of certified points for RotZ on part segmentation.
tation version of PointNet [36] on 64 points, with an IoU
score of 0.82. The model architecture is shown in App. C.
Table 5 shows the percentage of correctly classified points
remaining invariant under RotZ with 5° splits, showing that
DeepG3D and Taylor3D can certify robustness for most
points, even for large rotation angles up to ±10°. Moreover,
the method scales to larger point clouds with 1024 points,
with 95.5% of points certifiably robust to rotations of ±5°.
4.5. Discussion
Point cloud models achieve high accuracy on natural
datasets, and 3DCertify shows that such models are also
highly robust against 1D rotations, even for large angles.
However, in line with our results, Zhao et al. [66] showed
that 3D rotations achieve a 95% attack success rate with
angles as small as ±2.81°, implying that certification on
the same model cannot scale beyond such small angles. In
this light, our results for 3D rotations of ±5° are mean-
ingful though they highlight a need for further research
on robust architectures. Moreover, our guarantees for ℓ∞-
perturbations of ϵ = 0.01, roughly 1% of the object’s size,
indicate that 3DCertify is applicable beyond semantic trans-
formations. Our robust training results demonstrate that
max pool is the best symmetric feature-aggregation function
in terms of accuracy and provable robustness, confirming
its importance for point cloud models. Finally, we note that
current certifiers based on linear relaxations cannot compute
efficient bounds for PointNet’s T-Nets, which are known to
boost the model’s accuracy [36]. We thus consider investi-
gating approaches to certify T-Nets without sacrificing pre-
cision an interesting direction for future work.
5. Conclusion
We presented 3DCertify, the first scalable verifier able to
certify robustness of 3D point cloud models against a wide
range of semantic 3D transformations including rotations,
shearing, twisting and tapering. The key insight of 3DCer-
tify is a novel method which enables efficient and precise
computation of linear relaxations for these transformations.
Combined with an improved relaxation for max pool layers,
our extensive evaluation on two datasets with object classi-
fication and part segmentation illustrates the effectiveness
and broad applicability of 3DCertify.
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A. 3D Transformations and Their Relaxations
In this section, we define the semantic transformations
that we consider (App. A.1) and provide the taylor relax-
ations for the transformations (App. A.2), as well as their Ja-
cobians for DeepG3D (App. A.4). We also give some back-
ground on the interval arithmetic used to compute bounds
on the approximation error (App. A.3).
A.1. Semantic Transformations
3DCertify can handle a wide range of semantic trans-
formations, including 3D rotation around any axis with
θ ∈ R as defined in Eq. (5). We can also certify shearing,
twisting, and tapering of a point cloud, defined pointwise
(since each point is transformed independently) for a point
p = (x, y, z)T as
Shear(p,θ) =








( 12θ21z + θ2z + 1)x( 12θ21z + θ2z + 1)y
z

or any composition of these functions.
A.2. Taylor Relaxations
In Section 3.2, we presented the general form of our
linear bounds fl(P,θ) and fu(P,θ) for any twice contin-
uously differentiable transformation function f(P,θ), as
well as the relaxation for RotZ as an example. Rotation
around the other two axes, i.e., RotX and RotY can be
computed analogously. Here, we list the linear relaxations
for the remaining transformation functions we use in our
experiments.
All transformations can be applied to each point indi-
vidually, allowing us to denote them for a single point as
f(p,θ) with p = (x, y, z)T ∈ P . For each transforma-
tion, we list the first-order taylor polynomial Q(p,θ) and
remainder R(p,θ), such that f(p,θ) = Q(p,θ)+R(p,θ).
As described in Section 3.2, we use interval arithmetic
(App. A.3) to get real-valued bounds lR ≤ R(p, θ̄) ≤ uR
for the interval θ̄ = [lθ,uθ] with t = (lθ + uθ)/2 and
therefore the lower constraint fl(p,θ) = Q(p,θ) + lR and
upper constraint fu(p,θ) = Q(p,θ) + uR.
Shearing:
QShear(p,θ) =






 (θ1 − t1) +
0z
0
 (θ2 − t2)















 (θ̄ − t)2
Tapering:
QTaper(p,θ) =






 (θ1 − t1) +
zxzy
0






 (θ̄1 − t1)2
A.3. Interval Arithmetic
When evaluating functions such as R(P,θ) on intervals,
we use the following standard operators:
− [xl, xu] = [−xu,−xl]
[xl, xu] + [yl, yu] = [xl + yl, xu + yu]
[xl, xu]− [yl, yu] = [xl − yu, xu − yl]
[xl, xu] · [yl, yu] = [min(xlyl, xlyu, xuyl, xuyu),
max(xlyl, xlyu, xuyl, xuyu)]
For mixed operations with scalars, i.e., a ∗ [xl, xu], we can
treat the scalar as an interval with one element: [a, a] ∗
[xl, xu].
In addition to these basic operators, we use the following
12
sine function:
sin([xl, xu]) = [yl, yu], where
yl =
{




1 π2 + 2kπ ∈ [xl, xu]
max(sin(xl), sin(xu)) otherwise
with k ∈ Z. Similarly, we can define the cosine function:
cos([xl, xu]) = [yl, yu], where
yl =
{




1 2kπ ∈ [xl, xu]
max(cos(xl), cos(xu)) otherwise.
To compute the square x2 of x = [xl, xu], we could sim-







u] xl ≥ 0
[x2u, x
2




Using these operators and functions, we can evaluate all
of our relaxations and their derivatives with intervals as in-
put.
A.4. Jacobian Matrices
Computing linear relaxations using Deepg3D (Sec-
tion 3.1) requires the Jacobians of our 3D transformations,
both with respect to the transformation parameters and with
respect to the point cloud inputs. For example, for 3D rota-
tion around the z-axis with θ ∈ R, as defined in Eq. (5), we
compute
∂pRotZ(p, θ) =





−x sin(θ)− y cos(θ)x cos(θ)− y sin(θ)
z
 . (11)
The corresponding Jacobians for Shear, Twist and Taper
(Section 4.1) are given by:
∂pShear(p,θ) =























B. Proof for Composition of Transformations
To show that our taylor approximations introduced in
Section 3.2 can be applied to the composition of multiple
transformations, we show that the composition of two twice
continuously differentiable functions is itself twice contin-
uously differentiable. That is, given two twice continuously
differentiable functions f : Rn 7→ Rp and g : Rm 7→ Rn,
we want to show that h = f ◦ g is also twice continuously
differentiable.
To simplify notation, we define y = f(u) and u =
g(x). Using the chain rule, we know that the first-order












Furthermore, we know that f and g are twice differentiable,
hence Eq. (12) consists of compositions, products and sums
of differentiable functions and thus is again differentiable.
We therefore conclude that f◦g is itself twice differentiable.
It remains to be shown that the second-order derivatives
are continuous. Using Faà di Bruno’s formula, we can write























We know that f , g and their first- and second-order deriva-
tives are continuous. Equation (13) is therefore a combi-
nation of compositions, products and sums of continuous
functions, which means it is itself continuous. This means
f ◦ g is twice continuously differentiable and we can there-
fore calculate Taylor bounds for any composition of twice
continuously differentiable transformations.
C. PointNet Architectures
For both object classification and part segmentation, we




For object classification, we use the following network
architecture:
No Type Normalization Activation Features
1 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 64
2 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 64
3 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 64
4 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 128
5 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 1024
6 MaxPool 1024
7 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 512
8 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 256
9 Linear SoftMax num classes
The first block of linear (fully connected) layers (no 1
to 5) is executed on each point individually, but sharing
weights across all points. We implement this via 1D
convolution layers with stride 1 as in the original work by
Qi et al. [36]. Layer 6 pools each feature across points.
During training, a dropout of 30% is applied for layer 8.
Part Segmentation
No Type Normalization Activation Features
1 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 64
2 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 128
3 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 256
4 Linear BatchNorm 128
5 MaxPool 128
6 Repeat 128
7 Concatenate (1, 2, 3, 6) 576
8 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 256
9 Linear BatchNorm ReLU 128
10 Linear SoftMax num parts
The architecture for part segmentation differs in some
ways, since it needs to predict a label for each point in-
dividually. Again, the first block of linear layers (1-4) is
applied to each point individually with shared weights and
max pool combines per-point features to one global feature
vector. Layer 7 concatenates the local features of layers 1 to
3 with the global feature from layer 5 for each point by sim-
ple concatenation. The last 3 linear layers are again applied
individually for each point on the combined local and global
feature and predict the part the particular point belongs to.
Since DeepPoly [44] cannot handle this architecture for
part segmentation, we implement novel relaxations for the
concatenation and repeat layers. In particular, the trans-
former for concatenation requires the verifier to handle lay-
ϵ 0.005 0.010 0.015
DeepPoly [44] 72.8 33.3 3.7
Ours 79.0 38.3 6.2
Table 6. Percentage of certified images with different max pool re-
laxations for two different image classification tasks for ℓ∞ noise
perturbations.




Table 7. Percentage of certified point clouds with 64 points for
different max pool group sizes for ±3° rotation.
ers with multiple predecessors, which is out of reach for
current state-of-the-art verifiers. We provide our implemen-
tation in the accompanying code.
D. Additional Experiments
In this section, we present additional empirical evidence
for the benefits of our improved max pool relaxations in
App. D.1, and investigate the effect different max pool
group sizes have on certification results. We also show that
Taylor3D efficiently scales to real-world point cloud sizes
in App. D.2, with running times of only a few milliseconds.
D.1. Improved Max Pool Relaxation
Applications beyond point clouds In Section 4.2, we
show that our improved max pool relaxation, introduced in
Section 3.3, significantly improves certification for Point-
Net models compared to the previous state-of-the-art, es-
pecially for models with larger pooling layers. Here, we
demonstrate that our new relaxations are useful beyond
PointNet, i.e., for any network architecture containing max
pool layers. To that end, we show certification results for
a convolutional image classification model with nine conv/-
linear layers and two max pool layers for the MNIST [21]
dataset in Table 6, comparing our improved relaxations with
the best baseline. Our improved max pool relaxations con-
sistently outperform the previous state-of-the-art across all
ϵ-values, significantly increasing the number of images for
which we can certify correct classification. These results
demonstrate that models beyond the 3D point cloud domain
benefit from our new relaxations.
Max pool group size Our improved max pool relaxation,
introduced in Section 3.3, requires computing the convex
hull of the polyhedral relaxation, for which the running time
grows exponentially in the number of input neurons. This
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RotZ Twist
Points Taylor3D DeepG3D Taylor3D DeepG3D
100 000 0.036 393 0.070 366
200 000 0.070 887 0.169 848
300 000 0.104 1502 0.266 1496
Table 8. Running time in seconds to compute the relaxations
for different real-world point cloud sizes with Taylor3D and
DeepG3D. Taylor3D achieves speed-ups of up to 14 442x for
RotZ and 5 624x for Twist.
is why we recursively split the max pool operation into sub
groups. Table 7 shows the certification accuracy and aver-
age running time of DeepPoly with the improved max pool
relaxation for different group sizes. Increasing the group
size beyond this range is impractical (i.e., more than 3h
per point clouds) due to the exponential scaling behavior
of convex hull computation. Nevertheless, our experiments
indicate that our recursively partitioned relaxation is not
impeded by this constraint since the different group sizes
do not influence certification performance (while, in theory,
computing the relaxation over all inputs should be most pre-
cise), allowing us to optimize for improved running time.
D.2. Scaling
3D processing of LIDAR point cloud data is an active
area of research. The main challenge is the huge size of
point clouds (in the order of 100k points [15]) that have
to be processed in real-time for most applications. Both
DeepG3D and Taylor3D scale linearly with point cloud size
and can be parallelized perfectly across points. Table 8
shows the running time of computing linear relaxations for
large point cloud sizes using Taylor3D and Deepg3D re-
spectively. All experiments are run on an AMD EPYC
7601 processor with 2.2 GHz. Taylor3D is efficiently im-
plemented as vectorized operations using Numpy [18] and
run on a single thread. DeepG3D uses the original par-
allelized implementation [2] and runs in parallel with 16
threads. The results show that, while both implementations
scale linearly in the point cloud size, Taylor3D is signifi-
cantly more efficient, computing relaxations in only a few
milliseconds event for large point cloud sizes on a single
thread, thereby achieving speed-ups of up to 14 442x over
DeepG3D. This enables easy and efficient scaling to real-
world applications.
E. Max Pool Analysis
The state-of-the-art linear relaxations for max pool are
imprecise, especially for many inputs to the pooling layer.
We demonstrate this by plotting the mean divergence be-
tween DeepPoly’s upper and lower bounds for each of
PointNet’s layers in Fig. 2, where we observe that the















Figure 2. Plotting the mean difference between upper and lower
bounds of neurons after each layer shows that the precision sig-
nificantly decreases after the max pool and therefore motivates the
need for improvement. Note the logarithmic scaling of the y-axis.
bounds start to significantly diverge after the max pool
layer.
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